"...Since our favourite group of UMNO-loving inbreds have run out of sextapes in their porn stash to target politicians opposing UMbred, they have turned their focus towards Lim Guan Eng’s 16-year old son.
It’s one thing to watch sextapes over and over again – like a sex maniac – just to spot if the ‘actor’ looks like Politician X or Customs Officer Y.
But it’s an entirely different thing to conjure up stories of a 16-year old boy ‘touching’ a 16-year old girls private parts.That’s called being a pedophile.
Or at least, a pedophile with sex fantasies involving MINORS i.e. kids below the age of 18. Punishable by law, if I may say so.
Especially since they made this up, it involves actual living people, and involves the fabrication and defamation of minors in the context of sexual elements.
Khairy ‘sonafabitch’ Jamaluddin’s displayed a sexual interest into the propagated fictional story of LGE’s son: See this Link: Khairy Twitter
UMNO is fucked up. They’re comprised of sexual baboons that once they hit 60, they rely on Viagra and watching shit on papagomo’s blog."
The girl whose photograph was used by pro-Umno bloggers (ie PAPA GOMO) to level accusations of sexual harassment against Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng’s son has denied ever meeting or hearing of the 16-year-old schoolboy.
Chess grandmaster Anya Sun Corke said today that she was “shocked, dismayed and baffled” as to how her photo was used without her knowledge or consent.
“I have never met or even heard of any of the people involved. I have never been physically assaulted in any way. I have never been victimised in any way by this boy or his family.The only way in which my ‘modesty was outraged’ has been by the publication of my picture in connection with these scurrilous and unfounded rumours,” the undergraduate at Wellesley College said in a statement.
Pro-Umno bloggers had claimed that Lim’s son had assaulted a 16-year-old schoolmate and tried to escape punishment by using his father’s name.
But the DAP showed at a press conference on Wednesday screenshots from the blogs which used pictures of Corke that matched those from www.chessbase.com.
Lim had denied the allegations on Tuesday, saying he was furious with the “barbaric lies” made about his teenage son by “pro-Umno ferocious beasts.”
His colleagues in Pakatan Rakyat (PR) have come out strongly in support of the DAP secretary-general against what they call “the lowest gutter politics” seen in decades.
The principal of SMK Heng Ee in George Town also moved two days ago to put an end to the accusations, calling them “completely untrue.”
Sensing growing public anger, Umno MPs have been quick to distance themselves from the allegations.
Corke said today that she has NOT visited Malaysia for seven years.
“I would also like to express my sympathies to the boy who was defamed by these baseless allegations. Last but not least, I hope that members of the public and the Malaysian media will respect my privacy and refrain from making unsolicited contact with me and my family, college, chess federation, and any other affiliation,” she said.
According to Corke’s Wikipedia listing, she “is a Woman Grandmaster and the top chess player from Hong Kong who is currently playing for England.”
She earned the title with her performance in 36th Chess Olympiad, playing for the Hong Kong men’s team.
She was the 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008 Hong Kong National Champion (for men and women), thought to be one of the youngest national champions ever.
The principal of SMK Heng Ee in George Town today moved to put an end to accusations that Lim Guan Eng’s son had sexually harassed a female student of the school, calling it “completely untrue.”
Goon Boon Poh told The Malaysian Insider that he was “shocked” when he read news reports of the allegation, and that he wanted to put an end to the matter as it could affect the image of the high school.
Pro-Umno bloggers including Bukit Gelugor Umno division chief Dr Novandri Hasan Basri had claimed that the Penang chief minister’s son had assaulted a 16-year-old schoolmate and tried to escape punishment by using his father’s name.
“The allegations are completely untrue. It is very simple, there’s absolutely no truth to it,” Goh told The Malaysian Insider today. The blogs said the incident occurred in May this year. CM’s son has not been a student of my school since the beginning of this year,” he added.
Goh said that the pictures posted on the blogs were not of Lim’s son, and that pictures of the alleged victim was not even a student of Heng Ee.
The principal said that officers from the state education department had conducted an investigation into the allegations on Monday, and were satisfied with his explanation on the matter.
“If I had kept quiet, the silence would have put me, the school in an embarrassing situation. Very simple if it had happened I would have known about it, wouldn’t I. No students had complained about any such case and the girl is supposed to be a classmate, so I want to just clarify the matter,” said Goh.
The girl whose photograph was used by Umno bloggers to level accusations of sexual harassment against Lim’s son has been identified as 21-year-old chess Grandmaster Anya Sun Corke.
Corke, who represents England in chess, has no ties with Penang and has never been a classmate of Lim’s son as alleged by Umno blogs, the DAP said in a press conference in Parliament today.
The girl is understood to be currently an undergraduate of Wellesley College in the United States.
Without revealing details of the allegation, the Penang CM (picture) said yesterday he was furious with the “barbaric lies” made about his teenage son by “pro-Umno ferocious beasts,” singling out Khairy Jamaluddin and other ruling party leaders for perpetuating the allegations through snide comments on blogs and social media sites.
The Rembau MP had written on micro-blogging site Twitter on Monday, “Mungkin dia roboh Kampung Buah Pala sebab nak ganti dengan Kampung Buah Dada” in response to another tweet by PapaGomo. [English translation: Maybe he destroyed Kampung Buah Pala because he wants to replace it with Kampung Buah Dada].
The DAP called on Khairy today to “retract his snide remarks and apologise to Lim’s son, who is an innocent victim.”
Sixty Pakatan Rakyat MPs are pushing for a motion to censure a Court of Appeal judge for alleged plagiarism.
Leading the pack, Bukit Gelugor MP Karpal Singh said that justice Abdul Malik Ishak had allegedly committed the offence while serving as a High Court judge in Johor in early 2000. The judge was accused of plagiarising a judgment by then Singapore High Court judge GP Selvam and the irony of the matter was that Malik was hearing a case regarding copyright.
Speaking at a press conference in Parliament, Karpal said: “We have filed the motion (to discuss the censuring) with the secretary of the Dewan Rakyat.”
“This motion (is in line with) Article 127 of the Federal Constitution which allows for discussion of the conduct of judges if 1/4 of parliamentarians support the motion,” he added.
The total number of MPs is 222, and with 60 backing the motion, it exceeded the required number.
Meanwhile, Karpal described the charge against the judge as serious, and did not reflect well on the judiciary.
“It is clearly misconduct of a very serious nature on the part of Malik bringing the Malaysian judiciary into disrepute,” he said, demanding that the judge be suspended and brought before a tribunal.
Karpal said that portions of Selvam’s judgment were copied without quoting and acknowledging the original source.
The DAP leader said he had written twice to Malik in August and September this year but did not receive a response from him over the matter.
Karpal added that the motion filed today was also in line with Parliamentary Standing Orders 27 and 36 (8).
Standing Order 27 states that advance notice must be sent to the Dewan Rakyat secretary before tabling a motion in parliament.
While Standing Order 36 (8) required a motion to be tabled in parliament first before there is any discussion regarding a public officer appointed under constitutional provisions.
According to the judiciary website, the Johor-born Abdul Malik was appointed to the Court of Appeal on July 16, 2007.
A law graduate from the University of Singapore – graduating in 1974 , Abdul Malik was appointed as a Judicial Commissioner on Oct 1, 1992, and subsequently, as a Judge of the High Court of Malaya on Aug 17,1994.
Prior to that he had served as a magistrate, deputy public prosecutor, state legal adviser, senior Sessions Court judge and advisory board chairman at the Prime Minister’s Department.
“Hudud cannot be implemented within the current constitutional and legislative framework.” -Malaysian Bar Council
"...It is clear therefore that the State list does NOT vest the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly, or any other SLA for that matter, the power to pass HUDUD laws OR to create criminal offences.
The law passed by the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly on HUDUD, in my humble opinion, is VOID for being ultra vires the Federal Constitution..." -Art Harun (Lawyer)
the implementation of hudud is a Constitutional impossibility until and unless two-third of our Members of Parliament would vote to amend the Federal Constitution to allow it to happen.
the time when such Constitutional amendment is moved would be the first time when our Members of Parliament would vote solely or predominantly along racial and religious line regardless of party policy or party whip.
The Bar Councilhas since issued a statement which basically echoes my opinion. Lim Chee Wee, the Bar Council’s President was quoted as saying:
"Hudud cannot be implemented within the current constitutional and legislative framework.”
Professor Aziz Bari Got It Wrong on the Federal Constitution
My friend, the learned Professor Aziz Bari was reported to have DISAGREED with the Bar Council’s view. The learned Professor was quoted to say:
“The key here is Islam, not criminal law.” The learned Professor pointed out that the Federal Constitution has set out the respective jurisdiction and powers of the Federal and State legislature.
As the powers to legislate on matters pertaining to Islam rests with the State, he argued that the State, including Kelantan, may pass hudud laws accordingly.
He also refuted that such move would result in double jeopardy for Muslim wrongdoers as, in his words:
“In other words, two systems is not a problem and we are not the only country in the world where this duality prevails.”The learned Professor opined that “power on Islamic law belongs to the State.”
He then referred to the decision of our Supreme Court (then, the highest Court in Malaysia) Mamat bin Daud vs Govt of Malaysia where the Court held that a provision in the Penal Code which impacted on Islamic law was invalid as the Parliament had no power to legislate over Islamic matters.
The learned Professor therefore challenged the Bar Council’s view that the Kelantan State does not have the power to enact the hudud law. I have the highest of respect and regard for the learned Professor but I beg to differ on his opinion on this matter.
(Although) the respective State Legislative Assembly (“SLA”) has the power to legislate on matters pertaining to Islam, I am somewhat doubtful that the SLA may pass any kind of law which creates offences and prescribes punishment for those offences in accordance with the tenet of Islam, especially when such offences and punishments are ALREADY created and prescribed by PARLIAMENT.
Division of Legislative Powers between Parliament and SLA
The Federal Constitution divides the legislative powers between the Parliament and SLA quite clearly.
The Parliament, or loosely, the Federal government, has the power to legislate over matters specified in List 1 (or otherwise known as the “Federal List”) of the 9th Schedule of the Federal Constitution.
The SLA on the other hand may legislate on those matters in List II (also known as the “State List”)of the 9th Schedule.
In addition, there are matters which may be legislated by both the Parliament and the SLA. These are contained in List III of the 9th Schedule (also known as the “Concurrent List”).
Included in the Federal List is, among other things:
“civil and criminal” law;
the constitution of all courts other than the Syariah Courts and
the jurisdiction and powers of all such courts.
That much is clear.
All this while, it is the PARLIAMENT which creates and defines all criminal offences as well as prescribing all punishment for those offences. There is no doubt about that.
(In this respect, there are already laws governing murder, theft and slander, which are three of the HUDUD OFFENSE prescribed by the Quran.The ONLY HUDUD offence which is NOT criminalised by the secular law isADULTERY).
THE STATE LIST (LIST II)in the FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
Let’s reproduce the whole paragraph 1 of the State List, so as not to cause any confusion*:
Except with respect to the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan,
i. ISLAMIC LAW and PERSONAL and FAMILY LAW of persons professing the religion of Islam, including:
The Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate, betrothal,marriage, divorce,dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy guardianship, gifts, partitions and non- charitable trusts;
Wakafs and the definition and regulation of charitable and religious endowments, institutions, trusts, charities and charitable institutions operating wholly within the State;
MALAY CUSTOMS: Zakat, Fitrah and Baitulmal or similar Islamic religious revenue, mosques or any Islamic public places of worship.
ii. Creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List;
iii. The constitution, organisation and procedure of Syariah courts, which shall have jurisdiction ONLY over person professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the matters included in this paragraph, but shall NOT have jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as conferred by FEDERAL law,
iv. The control of propagating doctrines and beliefs among persons professing the religion of Islam;
v. the determination of matters of Islamic law and doctrine Malay custom.
****The above provision is actually contained in one paragraph. I have broken it into several parts denoting the different areas of Islamic matters which the SLA may legislate to maintain clarity. ****
It is quite clear from the State List reproduced above that various Islamic matters ARE WITHIN the purview of the SLA.
The decision in Mamat bin Daud reinforces the view that STRICT adherence to the respective lists by the Parliament and the SLA in enacting laws is called for.In that case, a provision was included in the Penal Code by the Parliament which makes it an offence for anybody to cause religious disunity. The purport of that section was to maintain public order, a matter which is quite obviously within the purview of the Parliament.
However, in a 3-2 majority decision (with the late Eusoffee Abdoolcader, among others, dissenting), the Supreme Court held that that provision impinges on Islamic matters, which is in the State List and consequently the Parliament had no power to legislate on it.
It follows from that decision that the Court jealously guarded the purview, width and breadth of the respective Federal and State lists.No amount of encroachment will be allowed by either the Parliament or the SLA on each other’s powers.
Although the offence created by the Parliament in that case falls under public order, which comes under the purview of the Parliament, the Court still viewed that as an encroachment of the SLA’s power to legislate on Islamic matters.
It is therefore clear and obvious that the Court took a strict and stringent approach in determining the rights and powers to legislate of the Parliament and the SLA.
Kelantan State Assembly Has NO POWER to Legislate on HUDUD LAW
Applying that strict rule, it is my humble opinion that the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly does NOT have the power to legislate on hudud laws or the power to create criminal offences and prescribe “Islamic” punishments for those offences.
Matters concerning CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAWS are clearly within the power and purview of the PARLIAMENT by virtue of the Federal List.
To allow the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly to enact a law to create hudud offences and prescribe punishment for those offences would amount to the usurpation by the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly of the Parliament’s power to legislate over criminal matters.
Applying the strict approach in Mamat bin Daud case, any law passed by the Kelantanese State Legislative Assembly as such would be void for being ultra vires the Federal Constitution.
Does HUDUD come under State List of the Constitution ?
Is it true that hudud comes within the State List and therefore the SLA has the power to legislate on it?
We have to analyse the above State List to answer this question.
Paragraph (i) above:
concerns family, personal, inheritance and trust matters. That much is clear.
Hudud does NOT come within the ambit of paragraph (i) above.
Paragraph (ii)
The bone of contention is paragraph (ii) above.
It states that the SLA has the power over the creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List.
There are three important points to be made about THIS provision.
Firstly, the said provision is far narrower than the power given to the Parliament. Paragraph 4 of the Federal List spells out in the widest term possible the power of the Parliament to legislate over “civil and criminal law.”
That includes everything under the sun.
The only exception is “Islamic personal law relating to marriage, divorce, guardianship, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, family law, gifts and succession, testate and intestate.”
Any OTHER matters would come within the power of the PARLIAMENT to legislate.
Contrast that provision to paragraph (ii) above.
Paragraph (ii) does NOT say “ISLAMIC CIVIL and CRIMINAL LAWS .”
NOR does it say “the creation and punishment of offences IN the precepts of that religion.”
It also contains a very important exception, namely, “except in regard to matters included in the Federal List.”
That brings me to my second point.
Paragraph (ii) above only gives the SLA power to create and punish offences AGAINST the precepts of Islam. It does not give power to the SLA to create and punish offences IN the precepts of Islam.
The established hudud offences, namely, murder, adultery, slander and theft are not offences against the precepts of Islam. They are offences within or in accordance with the precepts of Islam.
The failure to observe and appreciate this aspect of the provision has often led to a misconception that the State has the power to create any kind of offences as long as those offences are regarded as offences IN Islam. That is entirely wrong.
No less than our Federal Court, in Sulaiman Bin Takrib v Kerajaan Negeri Trengganu & Anor has, with respect, fallen into such interpretational misdeed when it held that the SLA had power to create offences “against the precepts of Islam” although by doing so, a criminal offence would be create so long as no such offence has been created by the Parliament. Former Chief Justice Abdul Hamid in his judgment says:
“In the instant case, as the offences are offences against the precept of Islam, as there are no similar offences in the federal law and the impugned offences specifically cover Muslims only and pertaining to Islam only, clearly it cannot be argued that they are “criminal law” as envisage by the Constitution.”
It has been my absolute pleasure and honour to have appeared before the learned CJ on some occasions. FCJ Abdul Hamid was a learned Judge for whom I have the highest of respect. However, his Lordship’s test in the above case is, in my humble opinion, wholly unsatisfactory.
The test is not whether there has been an offence created by the Parliament on the issue at hand.
Rather the test is whether the offence created by the State Legislative Assembly is “against the precepts of Islam.”
In this respect, offences AGAINST the precepts of Islam are TOTALLY DIFFERENT in nature and manifestation from offences IN the precepts of Islam.
This brings me to my third point. Paragraph (ii) above clearly prohibits the SLA from legislating on matters which “are included in the FEDERAL list.”
How clearer can that be?
Is there any ambiguity there?
The prohibition is as clear as daylight.
As long as the matter sought to be legislated by the SLA is included in the FEDERAL list, the SLA is PROHIBITED from legislating on it.
That prohibition is ABSOLUTE.
Applying Mamat bin Daud above, that prohibition must be STRICTLY observed.
It does not say the prohibition only applies if the matters are included in the Federal list and they have been legislated by the Parliament. CJ Abdul Hamid is WRONG in Sulaiman Takrib case in this respect.
It is clear therefore that the State list does NOT vest the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly, or any other SLA for that matter, the power to pass hudud laws or to create criminal offences.
The law passed by the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly on HUDUD , in my humble opinion, is VOID for being ultra vires the Federal Constitution.
"Asked specifically if Pakatan will be implementing the hudud law if it comes into power in the next election, Anwar said: “No, there is NO consensus (on that)".
The coalition agreed to disagree on existing enactments pertaining to hudud law in Kelantan and Terengganu, as the enactments predate the formation of Pakatan." -Malaysiakini
The Beginning of the MAJOR COLLAPSE of Pakatan Rakyat.
From a FaceBook User's posting
When RELIGION is put on to the fore-front of politics by parties in the Pakatan Rakyat coalition over ECONOMIC issues facing the country, voting based on religious divide for PAS and UMNO takes precedence over other more important issues, not only for muslims , but for non-muslims as well.
Religion is a highly emotive issue for Malays and non-Malays.
Most of the PAS MPs in the Federal Territory, Perak and Selangor who won on the back of non-muslim votes will lose their seats in Parliament as non Muslim voters will abandon PAS candidates. DAP members will not campaign for PAS candidates. PAS supporters will not vote for DAP candidates nor campaign for DAP candidates as they did for the 2008 GE.
PAS went for broke on hudud issue, although this is limited to Kelantan. When PAS leaders including Nik Aziz went public on its stand without prior discussion with its coalition partners, DAP feels the sense of betrayal by PAS.
PKR was forced to make a stand and being a Malay-based party, Anwar had to stand on the side of PAS on hudud. Since PKR supports huddud, non Muslim voters who stood by PKR in 2008 will abandon PKR candidates in droves.
It is an issue of loss of trust and faith by muslim and non muslim supporters of Pakatan in the ability of DAP, PAS and PKR to work together on a common policy platform for the coming GE especially on the emotive issue of the Islamic state.
There is a sense on the ground that Pakatan voters had enough of this unresolved issue.The latest move by PAS to go for broke on the hudud issue is the tipping point.
Muslim votes will either go to UMNO or PAS.PAS will lose big from non Muslim voters. But MCA may not benefit from Chinese votes at all. The question is: will NON Muslim voters who had voted Pakatan in 2008 will vote for UMNO when UMNO faces PAS/PKR this time around? Or more likely, they will not turn out for voting in these constituencies.
The prediction is BN will retain Perak and Selangor, and other states as non Muslims will return back to BN. Penang remains in DAP hands. Kelantan will remain in PAS hands and Kedah is 50:50.
BN is guaranteed of the two-third majority in Parliament in the next GE. PAS, DAP and PKR can kiss goodbye their ambition of having the keys to Putrajaya. PKR will be the biggest loser in the next GE.
Its the end of the honeymoon for Pakatan Rakyat basically.
If the Palestinian application for United Nations full membership actually takes place Friday and the United States uses its Security Council veto to stop the process, it will be the final step in a predictable and preventable tragedy playing out.
Some are arguing that Washington might actually abstain, thereby gaining considerable favorable sentiment from much of the world and also sending a signal to Israel that there are limits to the bilateral relationship.
But it is far more likely that President Barack Obama, who has stated over and over that he will protect Israel in international forums, will not flinch when he calls on Susan Rice to cast the fatal vote.
Any expectation that the president might hesitate either because it is the right thing to do or because it benefits the United States is fanciful, particularly with a presidential election looming in 2012.
Washington’s attempts to “mediate” the situation have really been limited to pressuring the Palestinians to back off. Sending National Security Council official Dennis Ross, “Israel’s lawyer,” to Ramallah to talk around the Palestinian leadership should, if anything, indicate to the Palestinians that Washington is, as it always has been, firmly in the Israeli corner.
So let us assume that Palestine will feel compelled to seek full U.N. membership as the world’s 194th nation and that Washington will then veto the application.
The first question then has to be whether the entire process had any meaning at all or it was just kabuki, a stylized show played out to an appreciative audience with a predictable ending.
The short answer is that the Palestinians will certainly be on the losing end — as they have been for more than 60 years — but the real losers will be the United States and Israel.
The mainstream media has echoed Israeli and American arguments that Palestinian statehood is meaningless without a negotiated settlement of issues on the ground. But Israel has made it clear that it has no desire to negotiate anything while it continues to occupy the West Bank, so the Palestinian choice is to accept the status quo, in which it is powerless and voiceless, or attempt to line up the international community more solidly behind it and shift the playing field.
Israel has been working hard to stop the process, or, at worst, to mitigate its impact by having a number of important nations, mostly in Europe, either abstain on the vote or vote no.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a glad-hand tour of European capitals earlier this year with that express purpose, and he received positive signals from the Italians, the Dutch, the Poles, and the Germans, though it is by no means clear how they will vote. It was for Israel a top national priority, which it has conveyed clearly to its friends in the United States.
Washington, at the urging of Israel, also joined in the effort, starting with warnings late last year to Latin American nations that recognizing Palestine as a state would be “unacceptable.”
More recently, the State Department and the White House have repeatedly expressed their desire that the Palestinians shelve their plans to seek a U.N. seat, and they have been assiduously working both in front of the TV cameras in New York and Washington and behind the scenes to convince the Palestinian leadership to cease and desist. The dialogue has been given some teeth by Congress, which is determined to cut all aid to Palestine if the U.N. action goes through.
One congressmen, Joe Walsh of Illinois, is preparing a motion that will provide congressional support for an Israeli annexation of much of the West Bank if the Palestinians proceed. Walsh describes Palestinian statehood as “absolutely outrageous.”
So Israel sees the Palestinian plan as a major threat and the United States appears to be on board, but many would reasonably observe that Israel often cries wolf and greatly exaggerates what it perceives as threats against it.
Is that true in this case, making it just another instance where Tel Aviv is adopting an extreme position in hopes that Washington will deliver the goods? It may not be.
Israel sees danger precisely because the Palestinian bid will do a couple of things that call into question some significant aspects of the status quo.
First of all, since it will certainly pass with a huge majority in the General Assembly if the Palestinians opt to go that route, it will provide overwhelming international confirmation of Palestinian rights with the U.S. and Israel standing on the wrong side on the issue.It will also severely undermine Israel’s moral position, such as it is, and emphasize the illegality of the Israeli occupation of parts of the West Bank. The process is already illegal in the eyes of the rest of the world, including the United States, but it will be even less tenable if a convincing majority of the world’s countries recognize Palestine as a state with defined borders and a national identity.
Second, recognition of statehood carries with it recognition that the state exists within defined space, in this case the 1967 borders. This has enormous significance because those borders include many areas being colonized by the Israelis, as well as East Jerusalem.
It means that any Israeli settlement that is on the other side of that border is considered completely illegal and that Israel is therefore a rogue state that is occupying and settling lands belonging to a neighboring state 44 years after the cessation of hostilities.
Even the New York Times in an article on Sept. 10 regarding the recent unrest in Egypt, noting that Islamic groups were not involved, conceded that criticism of Israel has a basis in the widespread popular perception that “Muslims, Arabs, and indeed many around the globe believe Israel is unjustly occupying Palestinian territories, and they are furious at Israel for it.” The rejection of Palestinian statehood and the debate surrounding it will only heighten that sentiment.
If the Palestinians are in the United Nations as a full member or even with limited rights, they will have access to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, where they can take legal steps against Israel and against individual Israelis. Even though Israel doesn’t recognize the legitimacy of the court, when it reaches the point where no senior Israeli government official, present or retired, can travel without concern over being arrested, it will have a major impact on how Israel sees itself and how the rest of the world sees Israel.
The clear depiction of Israel as an occupying power in violation of the Geneva Conventions, to which most of the world’s nations are signatories, would also fuel the Israel divestment campaign, which is another major concern of the Israeli government, and also legitimately so, as it could have a serious impact on the Israeli economy.
The Palestinians would also have recourse to other United Nations bodies. They would, for example, be able to appeal to UNESCO to stop the Israeli demolition of Muslim and Arab historical sites and the renaming of villages and other landmarks, a considerable benefit.
So Israel is right in understanding that the U.N. entry could have a profound impact, but the United States would hardly escape collateral damage from its veto and could turn out to be the biggest loser.
Policymakers in Washington like Joe Walsh forget Newton’s Third Law of Motion, though that assumes that they have ever heard of Newton. Newton said that every action produces an equal and opposite reaction. It is true in international relations just as it is true in physics, only in the real world it has come to be known as blowback.
What would be the possible blowback from an American veto?
John Whitbeck has correctly described the veto by Washington as a “shotgun blast in both of its own feet.” The United States is already perceived negatively in every Arab nation except Kuwait. It is seen as on one hand supporting liberalization and democratization of some Arab governments while at the same time suppressing fundamental rights in places like Palestine.
Worse still, if Washington cuts aid to the Palestinians because of their going to the U.N., it will be widely perceived as a de facto partner and enabler of the occupation of the West Bank.
The unfortunately well-deserved perception of blatant hypocrisy will alienate emerging “Arab spring” regimes even more from Washington and will almost certainly lead to anti-American violence, possibly extreme, in places like Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey.
American goods and services will, as a consequence, undoubtedly become less welcome in many parts of the world, while the U.S. veto will inevitably provide a recruiting bonanza for groups that use terror, including al-Qaeda.
And it could make every American traveler less safe when he or she goes abroad, while American soldiers stationed in foreign lands will inevitably become targets of militants, inspired by yet another example of Washington’s hypocrisy.
Vice President Joe Biden and Gen. David Petraeus had it exactly right when they observed that Israeli policies were endangering Americans. That was before they came to their senses and recanted, but apparently the president of the United States was not listening anyway.
Acceptance of full Palestinian sovereignty and statehood by Israel and the United States would give Tel Aviv a genuine negotiating partner and go far toward restoring the reputation of the United States of America, while rejection of it will end the charade forever, eliminating any chance for any kind of viable peace process in the Middle East. And the damage extends beyond that.
Saudi Arabia has already warned that the U.S. veto will do irreparable damage to its bilateral relationship with Washington and will also forever destroy America’s reputation in the Arab world.
It would hasten the development of the clash of civilizations, “us and them” point of view, dividing much of the developing world from Washington. It would be the final and irrevocable step in a foreign policy that has brought nothing but disasters over the past 10 years.
(This article was first published in “Off The Edge” on January 15, 2009)
by
Clive Kessler Emeritus Professor University of New South Wales Australia
Once again the familiar argument has surfaced, or been desperately invoked, this time in the latest stand-off between the leading Pakatan Rakyat allies Karpal Singh and Anwar Ibrahim.
Hudud law, if implemented, will apply only to Muslims, Anwar Ibrahim again insists, so the question is one that concerns only Muslims, not Malaysian citizens of other faiths — or no conventional doctrinal allegiance at all. So non-Muslims have nothing to fear, no legitimate interest in the matter, and no right to express any opinion. The matter is for Muslims alone.
This is not the first time that we have heard this argument. It is standard debating “stock-in-trade”, not only from Anwar Ibrahim and the syariah-promoting elements in Parti Keadilan Rakyat but equally from the designated spokesmen of PAS and Umno as well as from the various associations of ulama and officially constituted religious authorities, state and federal.
Not just familiar, it is also, at best, inadequate and, more often than not, misleading. It is wrong for two basic reasons — reasons far more basic than any specific legal technicalities such as the issues raised over the interpretation of the 1988 court decision cited by Karpal Singh, or any similar individual legal judgment.
The first reason is this. Whether they are actually implemented and enforced or simply stand as symbolic signposts and “ambit claims” on the statute books, the formal authoritative assertion of the hudud laws — including such punishments as amputation and stoning and even death for apostasy — fundamentally changes the relation of the individual to the state and its legal order.
It substantially alters the balance between the state and the individual in the state’s favour. It thereby transforms the entire character of the state, arguably coarsening its laws and their impact upon public culture and social life.
When the state or any of its instrumentalities is suddenly empowered to hold, and potentially exercise, that awesome force — which it previously could not exert — over any of its citizens, or any section of them,the nature of citizenship itself is diminished and its meaning is reduced, not just for those directly “targeted” but for ALL citizens.
A state that declares itself ready to use such fearful measures, or even prepares to arm itself with them, is a state that announces its own capacity, both institutional and moral or psychological, for savage enforcement and retribution.
It is not a state that any ethically enlightened, socially emancipated or truly thoughtful citizen who had lived in a state without such fear-inspiring powers would freely choose to call home. A free citizen would refuse to exchange what they had previously enjoyed for this debased and degraded citizenship under this kind of regressive and repressive regime.
Once the syariah law and its hudud punishments are authoritatively instituted, this degrading of the character of free citizenship is a general effect.
It is one whose immediate human implications must soon affect all citizens, regardless of religion and social background, even if it is technically mandated only upon one section of the citizenry — in the Malaysian case the numerically preponderant and politically dominant section of the population.
This basic underlying change in the nature of the state, and in the character and extent of its power over its citizens, will inevitably transform the tenor of social life in general. So it will affect all the state’s citizens, not only those who are Muslims. Because it must affect the entire citizenry, all the state’s citizens without exception are entitled to have, and express, a view on the subject of hudud law implementation.
Every citizen of a modern state is entitled to voice a view whether or not that state should have the right to inflict dire physical punishment on any of its citizens, or even to enact hypothetically on a provisional basis laws of that kind whose effects are, to put the matter without euphemism, brutalising — either in fact, by their positive enforcement, or prospectively, by virtue of their intimidating inscription within formally codified law.
Even if still unenforced, their presence on the statute books cannot but have a clear, immediate and chilling effect upon all citizens by reshaping, in fact diminishing, the very meaning of citizenship itself. Even if it is only hypothetical or symbolic in intent, an assertion of the state’s right to mutilate and maim any citizen, even the least worthy and most criminally debased of them, can only demean everyone.
It demeans, too, the citizenship that they share and the law under which they live and through which their citizenship is created and sustained.
The introduction, even the mere hinted suggestion, of any proposal for the official infliction of pain on people’s bodies and souls — for outright crimes against their fellow human beings, or even for the exercise of independent intellectual and spiritual conscience — must markedly shift society away from the gentle end, and decidedly towards the crude and brutalizing end, of the ethical scale. That seems indisputable.
Any such legally mandated assault upon the citizen — any citizen or subject of the state — with its mutilation of bodies, maiming of souls, shaming and extreme humiliation of persons and its violation of personal conscience and human dignity will discredit the state, its laws, and those who uphold them. This is not a direction that a modern progressive state can take or its citizens, if they are thoughtful, condone. Those who endorse such measures must have a different agenda.
Every citizen of a modern state has the right to say that the national political community of which they are a member should not be in the business of chopping off hands and feet or even talking about, or hypothetically considering, the introduction of such measures — nor in the business of criminalising beliefs, including those of personal and spiritual principle, that are held in good conscience.
Regardless of their religion or faith affiliation, a citizen is entitled to say to the ruling authority:
“You cannot maim and painfully shame my fellow citizens — some of my fellow citizens, any of them — well, not in my name you don’t!
Because if you do, you not only enlist me as one of the perpetrators of this dire, extreme and callous act, you also make me one of its objects and victims.
As both implicated joint author and as implied target of this or any such action, I say no!”
Any contention that a citizen or any group of them should remain silent, and may be told to do so, because they have no legitimate say in such matters is unsustainable. It is a claim that fundamentally misunderstands the nature and meaning of modern citizenship as morally autonomous membership in the national political community.
Any citizen of a modern state, regardless of religion, is entitled to hold, voice and promote the view that the national political community of which they have long been a member — and long regarded in Malaysia, ever since its inception, as humane in its aspirations and progressive in its direction of development — should not suddenly assume, or (perhaps rhetorically to embarrass its political adversaries), even flirt with the previously unimagined power and right to cut off hands and feet or to criminalize individual beliefs held in good conscience.
Any such citizen would be entitled to take the view that such a dire innovation, when introduced or even officially considered — or merely intimated via some tactical political gesture — must unilaterally abrogate the fundamental contract that holds between a modern state and its citizens as its political stakeholders and moral shareholders.
Such a citizen has the right to the view that the state of which they are a member should not have, or suddenly grasp towards, any such recourse since — should it choose, especially as in Malaysia, to do so against its own history — the state and all its members stand to be demeaned by that action.
What the state does, it does in the name of its citizens — all its citizens — in general. All are implicated in its actions, and everybody is entitled, indeed obligated, to concern themselves with the moral meaning of actions for which they are in any measure responsible.
Every citizen is accordingly entitled to argue openly whether the state in which they hold citizenship should be permitted to impose such punishments on any of its citizens — and, as a citizen, to hold in good conscience that all stand to be demeaned if any one of them is so treated.
Every citizen has a right to hold and express a view whether he/she wishes his or her state to be such a state, a state that claims the right of recourse to such dire and extreme methods in the treatment of any of its citizens. Dire and extreme — let there be no mistake — these measures undeniably are since they involve the intimidatory “criminalisation” of behaviour and also thinking, on issues of legitimate personal moral and spiritual conscience.
They humiliate and punish in demeaning and savage ways that entail both terrible physical cruelty and extreme psychological degradation, the fearful violation and stigmatizing, at once and alike, of both bodies and souls.
Such legal provisions, even if they stand only “in reserve”, are statements about the kind of regime that the state is prepared, or earnestly aspires, to be and the kinds of measures to which it is prepared to have recourse.
Every citizen is, by definition, a stakeholder in the state, and all of them — not just one specially designated segment of the citizenry — are entitled to hold, voice and also promote politically a view whether the state of which they are all “part-owners-in-trust” should evolve towards or away from such a coarsening brutalisation of tone and character.
Some may question my use of such epithets as “coarsening” and “brutalising”. That is MY view.
Others may see the matter differently. That is their right. They may hold and argue the case for a different view of the matter.
As with those who would climb Everest not only without oxygen but barefoot, I wish them the best of luck.
Meanwhile for me, and many other people of sound and decent judgment, whether they be formally implemented or only indirectly intimated, punishments such as judicially-mandated amputations and stoning are nothing other than “coarse”, “crude” and “brutalising” in their effects, both individual and upon society and public culture broadly.
Those who see things differently may, if they hold such views simply as a matter of private conscience, remain silent. But if they wish to promote the case for syariah law and the hudud punishments as a matter of public policy, they must argue the case publicly.
They must argue, and persuade the generality of their fellow citizens, either that such measures are not coarse, crude and brutalizing or else that such a coarsening brutalization of social life, with all its humanly unworthy and demeaning consequences, is somehow socially beneficial and ethically uplifting. They may hold and try publicly to uphold such views. As I say, I wish them luck.
Meanwhile, there is only one principled stance available to a government — especially a government whose entire raison d’être is grounded in a commitment to the successful practising of intercultural and interreligious partnership — that is faced with the challenge from its clamouring opponents for the implementation of syariah law and its hudud provisions.
It will not do to retreat into temporizing prevarications such as the claim that the times are not yet right, the circumstances not yet appropriate, for their implementation. Rather, it must clearly say that their enactment is simply not an option — not now, not ever.
The leaders of such a government will be criticized and opposed. They will have to learn to answer their critics forthrightly. Those who argue — on supposedly democratic grounds, as some in PAS now do — that if a clear political majority want to live under hudud law then they are entitled to enact it nationally, regardless of other considerations, must be told that they misunderstand democracy.
They must be reminded that democracy is not the replacement of the premodern tyranny of the minority with a modern, electorally ratified tyranny of the majority. It is about political conciliation. It rests upon the thoughtful and deliberative negotiation, not the insistent and heedless overriding, of differences.
The times are over in Malaysia when people might say to their fellow citizens,
“We want this, we have the numbers, so you remain silent!”
Their end was signalled in March last year.
Democracy is a government not of reckless majoritarian maximalism but of limits. That, in fact, is the real and original meaning of the idea and Arabic word had (as in its derivative Malay forms such as terhad and berhad) and in its plural form hudud. They embody the notion of restraint and limitation.
The hudud punishments, in the fierce time of their origins, were stipulations of maximum limits that were not to be exceeded, not declarations of a mandatory retributive minimum that was always to be recklessly demanded, regardless of social and historical circumstances, and implacably enforced.
Those who call for the enactment of syariah law and the hudud punishments owe it to their fellow citizens, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, to acknowledge this historical fact — and its current political implications, especially for modern societies of the social, cultural and religious complexity of contemporary Malaysia. They need, in framing their own political programmes and agenda, to recognize and uphold that core notion of principled restraint — rather than to seek, always and ever further, to “push the limits”.
To their opponents and critics who — despite these persuasive clarifications of the real meaning of hudud and the nature of democratic public culture and governance — may still insist, either sincerely or for tactical political advantage, on promoting the implementation of the hudud sanctions and punishments,the leaders of such a government must learn to say:
“You want to cut off hands and feet — are you mad or bad? Or you want just to talk about, and toy mischievously with, the idea of doing so — are you crazy or evil?
This is the modern state of Malaysia with its formal legal codes, institutions and procedures, not the long ungovernable ‘badlands’ of Afghanistan. It is Malaysian politics that we are talking about, and Malaysian public life to which you presumably are seeking to contribute.
You want to uphold, promote and restore Islam? Fine. Let’s talk about it, about how to do it together.
But remember, Islam is much more than just the syariah, and the syariah is much more than simply hudud.
So why do you focus on the hudud, why is your emphasis so exclusively upon them?
Why do you make this single, archaic and poorly understood aspect of the syariah and Islam your key, even sole, political litmus test of Islamic authenticity? Are your reasons those of principle or of political advantage and strategy?
Are you really sincere in wanting to uplift, promote and restore Islamic faith and civilization in our time? If so, prove it! Prove it by demonstrating your readiness to sit down with us to devise and decide upon a direction and plan of action that we can all accept — Umno, PAS, PKR and Malaysia generally.
Join with us to create a modern Islamic form of society and sociability, of social action and social responsibility, that we can all embrace and be proud of — that all Malaysians may recognise as reaching towards what is unifying and universal, not divisive and politically partisan.
If you are not prepared to do that, we will all know, because you will have made clear, why your political focus is so narrowly and obsessively upon the issue of hudud. You will have proved yourselves people, and a party, of cynical stratagem, not of genuine principle.”
The second reason for the inadequacy of the bland assurances that non-Muslims need not fear the instituting syariah law and its hudud punishments, and therefore need not concern themselves with the implications of any such proposal, follows directly from the first.
In Malaysia the drive to institute the syariah law and its hudud punishments, ostensibly (in its proponents’ own terms) only upon the state’s Muslim citizens and residents, is inescapably fraught — all questions of principle aside — in direct practical terms.
It would involve the attempt to overlay and impose, upon a diverse and creative social pluralism of interacting and interpenetrating cultures, a mutually exclusive legal dichotomy, a juridical bifurcation, between the state’s Muslim and non-Muslim citizens.
It is, in its own terms, an exercise in creating two radically different and mutually exclusive zones of socio-legal space, Muslim and non-Muslim. It is questionable whether such a fundamentally bifurcated social order and legal dualism is sustainable. Perhaps, as the idea’s proponents apparently contend, it is, though I greatly doubt it.
But the question whether it is viable or not is again one that directly, immediately and legitimately concerns all the state’s citizens, not just those who as Muslims would be subsumed within the “Islamic legal zone” and made fully subject to the operation of the syariah law and hudud punishments.
In the modern world all questions about the nature and structure of the state, about the character and tone of its legal system, and about the operation of its legal institutions are the legitimate business, equally, of all the state’s citizens, without individual exceptions or broad categorical restrictions.
Every citizen is entitled to hold, voice and promote their own view whether the incremental, even surreptitious, creation of a bifurcated, and perhaps ultimately broken-backed, state is a good thing, in the general public and national interest.
Some years ago the noted Tunisian historian Hichem Djaït observed that the endeavour to institute the syariah law in modern, complex, socially pluralistic and culturally diverse states (such as Malaysia, for example) risked simply recreating the inherent duality of classical Islamic society and, specifically, its foundational legal dualism.
Such societies, he held, are comprised of two distinct socio-legal zones or components, each the reverse image of the other:
a Muslim zone or space in which people held full rights but a diminished freedom; and
a non-Muslim zone in which the state’s other citizens or subjects, while enjoying a far greater measure of freedom to do as they pleased regardless of syariah-based restrictions and limitations, also “enjoyed” (if that is the right word!) or were allowed to exercise diminished rights.
Is this the kind of society that Malaysia wishes to become? Perhaps. Perhaps not.
Either way, it is a matter that Malaysians — all Malaysians, without exception — are entitled and, so it seems to me, urgently need to discuss publicly and debate freely. It simply will not do to suppress public consideration of this vitally important national question.
Yet that is what seems to be happening in Malaysia these days.
Constructive and necessary public consideration is, as ever, being thwarted by artful recourse to the disabling dichotomy of which Hichem Djaït speaks:
By saying to one half of the population that they have no need or right to discuss the question since they are not Muslims and so are supposedly unaffected by whatever others may decide; and
By saying to the other half that as Muslims they have the right to be concerned with the question but not the standing to engage in any public discussion of it, that being the exclusive prerogative and province of those who alone know best, the ulama.
Whether this is a scenario for the progressive instituting and implementation of Islamic legal principles and values to the life of a modern democratic nation seems doubtful. It looks more like a strategic plan for instituting a creeping, historically regressive and anti-democratic clericalism.
That is my opinion.
But the choice is not for me to make but for Malaysians: all Malaysians as citizens, or only some of them as the historic and unchallengeable custodians, as they understand their role, of the syariah and its prerogatives.
Either way, the outcome and how it is reached, and by whom, will prove fateful for Malaysia for a long time to come.
That’s why the question of syariah law and hudud implementation is everybody’s business in this country.
Prime Minister Najib Razak will abolish the Internal Security Act and amend a number of laws which have long been criticised as overt attempts to stifle democracy.
In a special televised address late this evening, the eve of Malaysia Day, Najib announced the following:
Abolishment of Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960, which allows detention without trial.
Three Emergency declarations to be lifted.
Amendments to freedom of assembly laws, which will recognise Article 10 of the Federal Constitution but will be "strongly" AGAINST street demonstration.
Annual renewal of publishing permits for newspapers will be replaced with a one-off licence, which can be withdrawn.
Repeal ofBanishment Act 1959 and
Revision of Restricted Residence Act 1933.
"As I had promised in my maiden speech when I first took over the post of prime minister on April 3, 2009, the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) would be studied comprehensively. In relation to that, I am glad to announce on this historical night, that the ISA will be abolished," Najib said.
"To prevent subversive acts, planned terrorism and criminal acts to preserve public order and safety, two new suitable laws will be formulated, based on the spirit and under the umbrella of Article 149 of the federal constitution.
"In principle, the Acts will be aimed at preserving peace, harmony of the people and the country."
The ISA, which is a preventive detention law, was enacted soon after Malaya obtained independence.
While initially the draconian law was used against the communists, it was often abused by the government to muzzle political dissidents.
Over the years, many key politicians were nabbed under the law which empowers the home minister to detain them for up to two years - and which can be extended indefinitely thereafter.
"Realising the reality that Malaysia has changed, feeling the pulse, apprehension and aspirations of the rakyat who want a Malaysia that has a more open and dynamic democracy, where opinions, ideas and concerns are given more attention.
"(We must do so to) stand on par with other democratic systems in the world, based on the universal philosophy of from the people, by the people, for the people. The government, under Section 3 Article 150 of the federal constitution, will table to both parliamentary bodies a motion so that all three proclamations of emergency are lifted," said Najib.
With the lifting of the Emergency declarations, it means that the ISA-type Emergency Ordinance (EO) will also lapse.
Apart from the six PSM leaders who were detained for one month in July, there are currently about 6,000 held in detention under EO.
Publishing permits for newspapers will remain, but the permits will not have to be renewed every year.
"A comprehensive review (of laws no longer relevant) will involve the Restricted Residence Act 1933 and the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, where the annual licences will be abolished and replaced with licences that will be issued until they are cancelled," Najib said.
"The government will also review Section 27 of the Police Act 1967, to take into account Article 10 of the federal constitution on the freedom of assembly, on the principle that it would be against street demonstrations.
"However, the permission to assembly will be given through methodologies which will be decided later, but it will consider international norms."
The reforms announced today follow years of intensive campaigns to broaden Malaysia's democratic space, particularly the abolishment of the ISA.
The Najib administration did not apply the ISA on any dissident, while his predecessor Abdullah Ahmad Badawi had applied the ISA on one opposition figure, a blogger and a journalist, back in September 2008.
But the most notorious use of the ISA was in 1987, when 106 people were nabbed under Operasi Lalang (Weeding Operation) during the Mahathir Mohamad administration.
Leading human rights watchdog Suaram estimates that about 10,000 people have been detained under the ISA without trial since its inception in 1960.
Although most people were detained for two years, there are records of some being detained for more than 20 years.
Najib's announcement today comes at a time when his approval rating, at 59 percent, hit a record low since a record high of 72 percent in May last year.
He is pressed to deliver on reform promises made when he took office in April 2009 as he attempts to improve BN's position in the coming general election, expected to be called within the next six months.
Critics have claimed that tangible reforms have hitherto been moving at a glacial pace and the announcements today are likely to improve his image.
Human rights activists and opposition parties are expected to claim victory over the reforms but this is unlikely to go down well with conservative factions within BN.
I must admit of being astounded by the claim by Professor Datuk Dr Zainal Kling that Tanah Melayu had never been colonised by the British, save for the period when Malayan Union was introduced. For the record, this is his claim:
The good Professor rested his claim as such on the fact that the Pangkor Treaty of 1874 between Raja Abdullah and the British Governor in Singapore did not mention that Perak was to be colonised but was only to be “protected” as a “protectorate” of the British.
The Professor went on to say that the only states which were colonised by the British in Tanah Melayu were Singapore, Penang and Melaka.
The good Professor may be correct in so far as historical terminologies go.
But history is NOT about terminologies and semantics. True history is about FACTS and REALITY.
Of course, facts may be looked at from different views, angles and perspective resulting in different interpretations and conclusions. Realities may also be subjected to the same treatment giving rise to the term of “administered reality”.
With all due respect to the good Professor, the British entry into Tanah Melayu and their subsequent entrenchment in Tanah Melayu’s administration leading to at least a de facto colonisation of the whole of the Tanah Melayu peninsula and her surrounding islets CANNOT be viewed solely from and within the effect of the Pangkor Treaty alone.
That would tantamount to an attempt to define the whole cosmos just by looking at the moon alone and nothing else.
Let’s however begin with the Pangkor Treaty 1874 (as the Professor had relied his thesis on it). The Pangkor Treaty 1874
For the record, prior to the Pangkor Treaty, the British, through the British East India Company, were already deeply entrenched in Tanah Melayu. It “colonised” Penang in 1786. Penang was later confirmed to be a possession of the British in 1800 by the then Sultan of Kedah. In 1819, Stamford Raffles took it upon himself to bring Singapore into the British fold.
Later in 1824, the British and the Dutch, presumably under the mandate of some godlike creatures residing somewhere within the mountains of Scotland, decided among themselves to divide the Malay Archipelago into two, thereby giving away Melaka to the British and Indonesia (Sumatera) to the Dutch.
In each of these three little states which the British saw fit to do as it please, they had a Governor who governed for the British. In 1867, these so called “settlements” became the “Crown Colonies” and came directly under the purview of the Colonial Office in London.
Meanwhile, in Perak, upon the death of Sultan Ali in 1871, a palace power struggle was brewing. The Raja Muda of Perak was Raja Abdullah. He should have gone on to take the thrones. As events would have it, the Raja Bendahara, Raja Ismail was pronounced as Sultan.
Perak was a rich tin producer at that time. The British were itchy to get their greedy hands on Perak. They were waiting for an opportunity. That opportunity presented itself when Raja Abdullah wrote to the Governor of Singapore, Sir Andrew Clarke, spelling out his desire to place Perak under British protection, and "to have a man of sufficient abilities to show (him) a good system of government."
The British surely did not need further motivation but to lend their generous helping hands to a Malay ruler in need of course. With that, the Governor very kindly entered into the Pangkor Treaty with Raja Abdullah on 20th January 1874. With that agreement in hand, Raja Abdullah was made Sultan of Perak (although Raja Ismail was earlier appointed Sultan by the Malay palace).
Raja Ismail (the then Sultan) of course did not attend the signing of the Pangkor Treaty as he did not recognise the agreement for obvious reason. But faced with the might of the very big and terribly friendly and generous British, Raja Ismail could not do anything other than seeing the throne being taken by Raja Abdullah. Sir W W Birch was appointed, pursuant to the agreement, Perak’s 1st British Resident.
(It was with considerable irony that Raja Abdullah – later Sultan Abdullah – was later thrown out to the Seychelles for conspiring to murder Birch).
Professor Datuk Dr Zainal was correct to say that the Pangkor Treaty did not say Perak was a colony of the British. But surely that does not mean that Perak was not colonised by the British.
So what if the British had said Perak was only a “protectorate”? Does it mean anything at all?
What if the British had said that Perak was a “paradise where everybody could smoke opium till they laugh and laugh and laugh and they die”? Does that mean Perak was a “paradise where everybody could smoke opium till they laugh and laugh and laugh and they die”?
Just because the British had said so?
The British, for whatever reason, chiefly because they had wanted to classify their dominions throughout the world for economics and social purposes (and also for qualification for British citizenship) had categorised its “conquests” into three classes, the colonies, the protectorates and the protected states. Semantically of course there are differences between the three.
But factually, it does not take a rocket scientist, or a learned bunch of thick-spectacled history professors to know that there were not much of a difference between them.
A colony is of course a state which the British had “annexed” or “settled” in. This state was presumed to be a jungle or a barren state where civilisation did not exist. And the very civilised British had of course “discovered” that state, just like Stamford Raffles did Singapore or Francis Light did Penang.
A “protectorate” is a state which the civilised and friendly (and generous) British had not annexed or settled in. This is a state where the British came in at the request of the helpless ruler of that state. It is a state where the British came to help or came to administer not through force but through agreements or treatise. Yes. That is a protectorate.
A “protected” state on the other hand, is a state which is protected by the British, again at the request of the ruler of that state. However, according to the British, in a protected state, the British did not involve themselves with its governance.
Yes. That is the difference between the three classes of the British conquests. Who said so? Well, the British said so. So, if the British said so, it must be correct right? Well, the British also said that Maggie Thatcher had balls. Remember?
Relying on semantics – and these semantics were coined and used by none other than the British themselves – the good Professor said according to the Pangkor Treaty, Perak was NOT colonised.
Well, is it really? Let’s look at the terms of the so called treaty.
First of all, Raja Abdullah was proclaimed by the British as the Sultan of Perak in place of Raja Ismail, who was already proclaimed in accordance with the “adat dan istiadat Raja-raja Melayu Perak” as the Sultan.
Now, may I ask, on what authority did the British make that appointment? On the fact that they are white men with guns and ammunitions far better than the collective keris and parangs owned by the Perakians? Now, if that is not annexation of Perak, tell me what it is.
Then, why don’t we (and the good Professor) loom at the salient terms of the so-called treaty.
Raja Abdullah was acknowledged as the legitimate Sultan to replace Sultan Ismail who would be given a title and a pension of 1000 Mexican pesos a month.
The Sultan would receive a British Resident whose advice had to be sought and adhered to in all matters except those pertaining to the religion and customs of the Malays.
All collections and control of taxes as well as the administration of the state would be done in the name of the Sultan, but the Sultan was to govern according to the advice and consent of the Resident.
The Minister of Larut would continue to be in control but would no longer be recognized as a liberated leader. Instead, a British officer, who would have vast authority in administering the district, would be appointed in Larut.
The Sultan, and not the British government, would pay the salary of the Resident.
Perak ceded Dinding and Pangkor Island to the United Kingdom.
Is this what a protectorate is all about? Does it not sound to all of us that Perak was as good as being annexed in a war with the British? Just consider the fact that the Sultan was to govern the state in accordance with the advice and consent of the British Resident. Perak was not colonised you say, Professor? Well, last night I saw pink cows flying over the crescent. Very nice.
Throughout the British presence in Tanah Melayu, we had three categories of states. The straits settlements, namely, Penang, Singapore and Melaka. Then we have Federated Malay States, ie, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang. These states were all not “colonised”, according too the British. They were just protectorate. Yea, right.
Then we have the Unfederated Malay States, which were Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and Johor. They were also termed as protected states by the British. Again, that does not mean that they were not colonised by the British.
Under intense pressure by the British for example, Johor accepted a treaty of protection by the United Kingdom in 1885. With that Johor accepted a British “advisor.”
The way Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu came under the “protection” and became branded as Unfederated Malay States is an insult to every Malaysians. And for the British to insist that they had never – officially and technically, that is – been colonised by the British is an act of colonial arrogance.
How did Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu become protected states of the British? Well, just as in 1824 when the British gods decided to divide this part of the world with the Dutch, in 1909, the British did the same with Thailand in the Anglo-Siamese Treaty 1909. In this treaty, these two gods divided the northern Malay states into two.
Under this treaty, Pattani , Narathiwat, Songkhla, Satun and Yala remained under Thai control, while Thailand relinquished its claims to sovereignty over Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu which integrated into the British realm in Tanah Melayu as protectorates.
Now, who gave the authority and mandate to the British and Thais to willy nilly decide among themselves who to own what? The Pope? The British queen?
The mere act of unilaterally dividing these collection of Malay states which even predate Melaka among themselves is incontrovertible proof that these states were under the whims and fancies of these two people, ie, the Thais and the British.
All the terms coined and marketed about by the British were only what they are, namely, terms. Semantics. That is all. The effect is the same.
They came into our country either through uninvited settlements or request by some people with vested interests.
Under the pretext of lending their hands to assists us, they raped, plundered and stole our resources.
They invited and brought people from foreign lands (I have to stress that I do not have anything against them) to work here.
They then divided all of us and ruled us.
Now, if that is not colonisation, I do not know what is.
The mere fact that they could come back to Malaya after the Japanese – who kicked them out earlier in about 5 days – surrendered and forced the Malay Rulers and everybody else to accept the Malayan Union (where they consolidated the Straits Settlements; the Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States into one Federation – is proof enough that they regarded Tanah Melayu – regardless of their semantic classifications – as their possession, as theirs to do whatever they liked.
Isn’t that a trait of every colonial Master, Datuk Dr Professor?
If they had not controlled the whole Tanah Melayu other than the Straits Setllements, how did they manage to force every state to accept the Malayan Union.
How did they manage to compel all our Malay Rulers to submit to their arrogance habit of dividing this territory as if we are some bunch of grapes which were to be graded and stomped on by their feet whenever they please?
What authority did the British have to “administer” us?
To submit too their system?
To their sense of justice?
To their system of civil service?
I am not saying that their systems are bad but under what authority did they manage to make us adopt their systems other than a systematic colonisation of our land?
Dear Professor, perhaps you should read the British Parliament hansard when they were debating the Malayan Independence Bill.
In the first place, if they did not colonise us, why and under what authority did they have to pass an Act of Palriament in their Parliament to give us “independence”?
Sometime, people show their true colours when the speak.
This is what the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, in a Freudian moment, said:
“Today, we are setting the seal on this work. We can, with Edmund Burke, rejoice that our ancestors have made the most extensive and the only honourable conquest not by destroying but by promoting the wealth, the number and the happiness of the human race.” (emphasis is mine).
Yes. That was, and still is, how they saw us.
Their honourable conquest.
And we were not colonised you say?
Related Article
Continuity and discontinuity: Prof Zainal Kling and Malaysian history
by
Clive Kessler (Clive Kessler is Emeritus Professor of Sociology & Anthropology at The University of New South Wales, Sydney Australia.)
It is not my objective to argue the historical facts of this issue, to take sides.
On the facts, Farish Noor and Art Harun are clearly right and Prof Zainal Kling, however ingenious the hair-splitting technicalities that he invokes, is WRONG.
But that is not the end, or even the heart, of the matter.
We must ask, what is the purpose, and what are the practical effects, of Prof Zainal now making his seemingly fanciful argument?
Prof Zainal’s argument is simply wrong, marvellously eccentric and absurdly counterfactual historically. But it is wonderfully clever, cunning and “very strategic”, politically.
By denying that Malaya, meaning the Malay states, was ever colonised by the British, Prof Zainal opens yet another front for struggle over the now increasingly contested question of Malaysian national sovereignty.
There is no doubt that, as one of the world’s nations, Malaysia exists. So it has sovereignty. But the grounding of its modern national sovereignty is a contested, and now ever increasingly inflamed, question.
Where does Malaysia’s national sovereignty lie, on what foundation is the sovereignty of the modern nation-state grounded?
In the people themselves, who are the nation, and upon whom, under the doctrine of popular sovereignty, all modern democratic nations are founded?
Or in the Federal Constitution, which is the self-declared basis of the nation’s common character, legal order and political life?
Or in the Sultans and Malay Rulers? And if so, by virtue of their recognised standing in the Federal and state constitutions?
Or on some other grounds?
With Prof Zainal’s recent comment, we are drawn back to this aspect, understanding, or (as some would have it) attempted revisionist redefinition of the national sovereignty question.
From 1986 and throughout the 1990s until 2008, the notion of Ketuanan Melayu, the idea or assertion that Malay political ascendancy had somehow been written into the constitutional foundations of the nation as part of an originating “social contract”, took shape and grew in strength.
The results of the 2008 elections came as a surprise, even shock, to many. To those determined to uphold the notion of Malay ascendancy, they were a threat and a challenge.
Was the primacy, as they saw it, of the Malay stake in the nation now, and henceforth, at risk?
From that time, and with the growth of new Malay political pressure groups such as Perkasa, a new determination to assert Malay primacy and national political ascendancy was voiced.
As part of that response, some new understandings of the ideas of Ketuanan Melayu and national sovereignty began to be developed and promoted.
Ketuanan Melayu, some now ventured to suggest, was not the crude “ethnosupremacist” idea (that, to some, the NEP seemed to suggest and underwrite) of the categorical superiority, or greater national entitlement, of Malays over non-Malays among the state’s citizens.
It had to do with the historical foundations and “public personality” of the national political order, of the nation.
It had to do with the origins of the independent federation of Malaya and later Malaysia as the direct lineal descendant, by a clear line of succession, from the various Malay states of the pre-British phase of the peninsula’s and region’s history.
This line of argument was further developed by, or at least on behalf of, the Malay Rulers and royal houses themselves by YM the Raja Muda of Perak Raja Nazrin, in a pre-Merdeka Day address at the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka in 2009.
On that occasion Raja Nazrin recalled the Wasiat Raja-Raja Melayu of August 5, 1957. Through that solemn declaration the nine Malay Rulers signified their assent to the constitutional arrangements of the new nation that was about to be born.
It had, for them, an older historical meaning and also looked forward to newer times.
For them the term was not just a technical legal or constitutional instrument; it also had powerful connotations suggesting a sacred heirloom or legacy.
By their Wasiat their Rulers affirmed their consent to Merdeka and gave it their blessing. The new nation born of the “Merdeka moment” was in that way stamped with their great prestige.
Yet their action, in their royal eyes, implied something more than simply a stamp of kingly approval.
The daulat that the Rulers embodied, they implied, was not merely sacred royal prestige. Their royal consent and blessing suggested — or has subsequently been read to suggest — that the daulat of the Rulers was in fact sovereignty, in the technical jurisprudential sense.
This view, whether held at the time or retrospectively asserted, holds, or again further implies, that from pre-colonial times and throughout the years of British control, the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers, or “Malay sovereignty”, had continued: uninterrupted and unbroken, unimpaired and undiminished.
Those who wish to maintain this position can, it seems, do so in either of two ways. They may argue that there was never any diminution of effective Malay royal sovereignty, understood as ultimately authenticating power and “reality-creating” authority, under British rule. That is a difficult position to sustain.
Or they may argue that, while the Malay Rulers and their quasi-sacred political position had in fact been eclipsed under the British, that diminution was entirely without force or meaning, since British rule was itself fundamentally illegitimate. Hence its effects and implications for Malay royal sovereignty can be ignored, or set aside as if they had never been.
In either case, throughout the years of British administration and control, Malay royal sovereignty, some suggest, had continued: either in full force but hidden or else dormant and, so to speak, “underground”, only to awake and surface again at the moment of national independence.
However bizarre and counterfactual they may seem to some, Prof Zainal’s recent comments on Malayan history do not come from nowhere. They are not simply an individual eccentricity or folly.
Prof Zainal, with his recent intervention, is simply the latest Malay political commentator, activist and practical ideologist who has sought to affirm this notion of the continuity of Malay sovereignty.
His position seems to be an artful combination of the two possibilities noted above. He seems to hold that British colonial rule was illegitimate and therefore not entitled to be of any ultimate consequence; and that pre-colonial Malay sovereignty therefore persisted — was never interrupted, severed or broken — throughout the illegitimate British interlude.
Prof Zainal’s position, and that of those who are of the same mind in these matters, is that not merely Malay sacred royal daulat but “sovereignty” in the modern technical jurisprudential sense had survived in the hands of the Malay Rulers, unimpaired and undiminished, throughout the “British years” from 1874 to 1957.
More than that, having remained with them, in their traditional custodianship, this sovereignty could be, and in historical fact was, passed on by the Malay Rulers (as they asserted in their Wasiat of August 5, 1957) to the new independent nation.
In that way, a new nation was born, but born as the vehicle and instrument of a continuing sovereignty that was far older. It embodied a moral authority and sovereignty of far greater political and cultural authenticity than anything that the departing British might have managed through its Colonial Office to fabricate.
This view, which seems to be that of Prof Zainal’s, or to underlie it, has profound implications for the continuing nature, now and well into the future, of the Malaysian nation, for its political character and the underlying foundations of its sovereignty.
The idea that the British never ruled, or governed, in Malaya may seem absurd.
But it is a very inventive and resourceful way, in the political context suddenly created by the national elections of March 2008, to argue — whatever those results may have been, and whatever outcome future elections may yet disclose — that the nation’s sovereignty, both in its historical origins and its contemporary character, is a distinctively Malay sovereignty.
The argument is one that seeks to assert, and place beyond any partisan dispute or political challenge, the notion that Malaysia is still Tanah Melayu, a nation embodying Malay sovereignty, and a nation inscribed in whose innermost nature is the principle of Malay primacy.
This, like it or not, is the new post-NEP and post-2008 notion of Ketuanan Melayu.
That, at all events, seems to be, either explicitly or by implication, the position of Prof Zainal and those who are of the same mind.
As for the controversy that his views have prompted, the central question is not whether they are historically correct (which is contestable) but whether they can be made to prevail politically.
That too is perhaps contestable. That is a matter for all the people of Malaysia to determine.
There is no other way, no basis other than common and ever renewed consent, to found and sustain a nation.
